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1
Introduction

The appointment of Christopher Columbus Langdell as Dane Professor at
Harvard Law School on January 6, 1870, is widely acknowledged to mark
the beginning of the modern American law school. 1 Langdell's discovery
of a new world of legal education was only a start. His disciples, especially
James Barr Ames and William A. Keener, developed what we recognize
today as the case method of legal education. 2 What generally has been
overlooked, however, is Alfred Z. Reed's observation "that literally all
good things are not first thought of in Cambridge" and "except on the
score of practicality, there was nothing startlingly original in [Langdell's]
idea." 3 Reed was clearly on the right track. Aspects of Langdell's method
of teaching, his beliefs about the scientific nature of law, and the rhetoric
with which he justified them resembled those of the past. Yet the first
dean of Harvard Law School has acquired the reputation of an innovator
of the first order, and a perverse innovator at that. His thought-and by
extension the form of legal education he helped create-has been identified as one of the principal sources of the sterile formalism that supposedly
marked late nineteenth-century American legal thought. 4
It is clear that Langdell's view of law emphasized the logical coherence
of legal rules. In Langdell's formulation, legal education is the study of a
few fundamental principles that are found in the original sources-casesand, by implication, are derived from those cases by the process of induction. Thus the student thinks for himself rather than merely accepts the
secondhand formulation of some treatise writer. This construct justified
the study of law as a science.
When it comes to deciding what was new in Langdell's thought, Reed
had it partly right. Langdell's ideas do share certain qualities with those
of the preceding generation of American legal thinkers. Teasing out the
innovative from the continuing opens a new prospect on late nineteenthcentury American legal thought; it also sheds new light on the significance
of the changes in legal education associated with Langdell' s tenure at Harvard. Any such effort must be grounded in an attempt to understand the
intellectual world in which Langdell lived his life in the law. For purposes
of analysis, that world can be divided into two parts: the realm of law as
ideas-as a system of principles that must be rightly understood if society
3
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is to be correctly governed; and the realm of law as procedure-as a system
of rules for resolving disputes in the courts, knowledge of which gives
lawyers an opportunity to make a living.
Langdell's professional world underwent significant change in both aspects during his lifetime. After the Civil War more than one thoughtful
American lawyer turned their minds to the idea of law as science and
subsequently encountered the writings of John Austin. Some recoiled in
horror; some, often those most involved with transforming legal education, found something that struck a chord, that resonated truly. The spread
of the new structure of pleading (which was embodied in the code of
procedure-the Field Code-written primarily by David Dudley Field and
first enacted in New York in 1848) helped change the way lawyers put the
law into action, a change Langdell lived as a practitioner in New York. 5
Both developments helped shape Langdell's legal science.
The legal profession does not exist in a vacuum, of course, and the
changes that occurred at Harvard during Langdell's deanship parallel
changes in society as a whole: changes in ideas of pedagogy; changes in
ideas about the sort of training that would equip young men for life in the
world; changes in the nature of professionalism and in the structure of
the legal profession. Modernization is a term used so often in historical
explanation that it sometimes seems to be bereft of meaning. If the modern
is equated with ideas and social structures we recognize as more like those
of the present day than not, however, it can be said that Langdell and
his colleagues lived during, gave impetus to, and even helped shape the
modernization of American legal education and legal thought.
The chapters that follow sketch the intellectual and institutional history
of these changes. In chapter 2, the often told story of the changes the new
dean brought to the law school in Dane Hall is placed in the context of
larger changes in both the university and society. To a great degree the
narrative becomes the story not of Langdell, but of Charles William Eliot,
whose vision informed not only the institutional nature of the law school,
but even to some degree its most distinctive educational attribute-the
case method. The case method, viewed as a method of instruction, is put
into the context of changing ideas of pedagogy in higher education and
changing social visions of the way young men are to make their way in the
world. In order to emphasize further the degree of change that overtook
American legal education and legal thought after the Civil War, chapter
3 describes the alien world of antebellum legal thought and education.
Antebellum legal science had two aspects: one shared the general American
view of science as the process of inducing from facts general principles
which in the end are reflections of the mind of the Creator; the other was
based on the supremely useful technical science of common law pleading.
Antebellum legal education drew on both sorts of legal science, although
antebellum law schools were devoted primarily to inculcating the science
of principles, a process that was not particularly rigorous or demanding.
Chapter 4 investigates in detail Langdell's writings on contracts and
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equity procedure to investigate the case method as an approach to understanding the law rather than as a pedagogical tool. Langdell's legal science
is described as a modification of the antebellum science of broad principles
in the direction of narrow, technical expertise. This change in focus is
traced to the influence of broad social and intellectual change, especially
the growth of the positivistic view of law as the command of a sovereign
rather than as the reflection of eternal right, and to the highly technical
changes in practice and procedure brought about by the adoption of the
Field Code in New York, where Langdell practiced for more than a decade
before returning to Harvard as dean. The new legal science, then, was the
product of changes i'n both broad and technical aspects of the antebellum
legal world.
The relationship between the changing law school and the legal profession is the subject of chapter 5, which necessarily focuses on broader
themes of social change. Whatever the novelty or wisdom of Langdell's
approach to legal education, the success of the reforms at Harvard seems
to require more explanation than the talents or luck of its dean. Just as
Langdell's views mixed elements of high abstraction and the influence of
the techniques of practice, the success of his school rested on the service
it performed, both in meeting the needs of the bar for social position and
prestige and in training young men for the realities of practice in a legal
world transformed by an early version of the information explosion. The
relationship between case method legal education and social standing is
illustrated by a discussion of the revolution that swept Columbia's law
school when the Langdell method supplanted traditional teaching. The
importance of practical training is shown by tracing the growth of law
reporting and the concomitant growing importance of research in the decided cases as the principal technique of legal practice.
Langdell's colleagues in the first generation of modern law teachers
appear in chapter 6, where their thoughts, as well as those of Nicholas
St. John Green and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., are analyzed in terms of
positivism, the heart of the new legal science.
While much of modern American legal education and legal thought
seems to have appealed to at least the most articulate members of the
profession, the new method held its terrors, which chapter 7 describes.
The rise of law schools as the setting for legal education, supplanting law
offices, led some practitioners to emphasize the need to educate prospective lawyers in the skills of practice. The resulting attack on the diploma
privilege actually received the support of Langdell and Eliot, support that
emphasizes the degree to which new ideas of legal education differed from
the old. Some of the fears and doubts, however, were directly related to
the idea of law promoted by teachers working at the reformed Harvard
Law School and were not so easily allayed. The case method, in fact,
became a prime focus of discontent. For some critics of the new law
school, the case method threatened their own cherished view of the nature
of law. Their vision lived for a time at Yale Law School, only to be sup-
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planted in the early twentieth century by the Harvard model. Just as the
revolution at Columbia illustrated the social power of the case method law
school, the evolution at Yale illustrates the changing intellectual underpinnings of legal education.
Opposition finally began to disappear, however, with the new century.
Chapter 8 examines some of the factors leading to detente, and places
special emphasis on the American Law Institute as the means of reconciliation between school and profession.
What follows, then, is an attempt to place the history of the formative
years of modern American legal education in as complete a context as
possible. It is an attempt to write a cultural history, a story of both intellectual and social change in one area of American life. The area is a limited
one, at least when the number of people directly involved is taken into
account. A handful of professors, a small number of articulate practitioners
who may have taught a bit, a university administrator here and there, and
perhaps a few thousand students, all male, are the actors and the audience.
What they set in motion, however, has had broad repercussions. Their
creation triumphed as the model for legal education. As the American legal
profession grew in numbers and influence, the importance of understanding the roots of modern legal education has also increased-or at least
become more interesting. American legal education in the late twentieth
century is in the midst of a period of intense introspection and selfcriticism. Much of this self-analysis has focused on the history of the enterprise. Most earlier historians have been concerned primarily with the
unique contribution of that first generation of teachers, especially Langdell: the case method and the idea of law which was assumed to underlay
it. The final conclusion of this work, however, is that the story is more
complex, and the forces involved in the creation of the modern law school
are more varied than has been realized.

